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Quantum discord as a resource for quantum cryptography
Stefano Pirandola
Department of Computer Science, University of York, York YO10 5GH, United Kingdom
Quantum discord is the minimal bipartite resource which is needed for a secure quantum key
distribution, being a cryptographic primitive equivalent to non-orthogonality. Its role becomes
crucial in device-dependent quantum cryptography, where the presence of preparation and detection
noise (inaccessible to all parties) may be so strong to prevent the distribution and distillation of
entanglement. The necessity of entanglement is re-affirmed in the stronger scenario of device-
independent quantum cryptography, where all sources of noise are ascribed to the eavesdropper.
PACS numbers: 03.65.–w, 03.67.–a, 42.50.–p
Introduction.– One of the hot topics in the quantum
information theory is the quest for the most appropri-
ate measure and quantification of quantum correlations.
For pure quantum states, this quantification is provided
by quantum entanglement [1] which is the physical re-
source at the basis of the most powerful protocols of
quantum communication and computation [2–4]. How-
ever, we have recently understood that the characteriza-
tion of quantum correlations is much more subtle in the
general case of mixed quantum states [5, 6].
There are in fact mixed states which, despite being sep-
arable, have correlations so strong to be irreproducible
by any classical probability distribution. These residual
quantum correlations are today quantified by quantum
discord [7], a new quantity which has been studied in
several contexts with various operational interpretations
and applications, including work extraction [8], quantum
state merging [9, 10], remote state preparation [11], quan-
tum metrology [12], discrimination of unitaries [13] and
quantum channel discrimination [14].
In this paper, we identify the basic role of quantum
discord in one of the most practical tasks of quantum
information, i.e., quantum key distribution (QKD) [15].
The claim that quantum discord must be non-zero to im-
plement QKD is intuitive. In fact, quantum discord and
its geometric formulation are connected with the concept
of non-orthogonality, which is the essential ingredient for
quantum cryptography. That said, it is still very impor-
tant to characterize the general framework where discord
remains the only available resource for QKD. Necessarily,
this must be a scenario where key distribution is possible
despite entanglement being absent.
Here we show that this general scenario corresponds
to device-dependent (or trusted-device) QKD, which en-
compasses all realistic protocols where the noise affecting
the devices and apparata of the honest parties is assumed
to be trusted, i.e., not coming from an eavesdropper but
from the action of a genuine environment. This can be
preparation noise (e.g., due to imperfections in the opti-
cal switches/modulators or coming from the natural ther-
mal background at lower frequencies [16–20]) as well as
measurement noise and inefficiencies affecting the detec-
tors (which could be genuine or even added by the honest
parties [21, 22]). Such trusted noise may be high enough
to prevent the distribution and distillation of entangle-
ment, but still a secure key can be extracted due to the
presence of non-zero discord.
By contrast, if the extra noise in the apparata is not
trusted but considered to be the effect of side-channel
attacks [24], then we have to enforce device-independent
QKD [2]. In this more demanding scenario, quantum
discord is still necessary for security but more simply
becomes an upper bound to the coherent information.
This means that secure key distribution becomes just a
consequence of entanglement distillation.
Quantum discord.– Discord comes from different quan-
tum extensions of the classical mutual information. The
first is quantum mutual information, measuring the total
correlations between two systems, A and B, and defined
as I(A,B) := S(A) − S(A|B), where S(A) is the en-
tropy of system A, and S(A|B) := S(AB) − S(B) its
conditional entropy. The second extension is C(A|B) :=
S(A)−Smin(A|B), where Smin(A|B) is the entropy of sys-
tem A minimized over an arbitrary measurement on B.
This local measurement is generally described by a pos-
itive operator valued measure (POVM) {My}, defining
a random outcome variable Y = {y, py} and collapsing
system A into conditional states ρA|y [25]. Thus, we have
Smin(A|B) := inf
{My}
S(A|Y ), S(A|Y ) =
∑
y
pyS(ρA|y),
where the minimization can be restricted to rank-1
POVMs [7].
The quantity C(A|B) quantifies the classical cor-
relations between the two systems, corresponding to
the maximal common randomness achievable by lo-
cal measurements and one-way classical communication
(CC) [26]. Thus, quantum discord is defined as the dif-
ference between total and classical correlations [5–7]
D(A|B) := I(A,B)−C(A|B) = Smin(A|B)−S(A|B) ≥ 0.
An equivalent formula can be written by noticing that
Ic(A〉B) := −S(A|B) is the coherent information [27, 28].
Then, introducing an ancillary system E which purifies
2ρAB, we can apply the Koashi-Winter relation [29] and
write Smin(A|B) = Ef (A,E), where the latter is the en-
tanglement of formation between A and E. Therefore
D(A|B) = Ic(A〉B)+Ef (A,E) ≥ max{0, Ic(A〉B)}. (1)
It is important to note that D(A|B) is different from
D(B|A), where system A is measured. For instance, in
classical-quantum states ρAB =
∑
x px|x〉A〈x| ⊗ ρB(x),
where A embeds a classical variable via the orthonor-
mal set {|x〉} and B is prepared in non-orthogonal states
{ρB(x)}, we have D(B|A) = 0 while D(A|B) > 0. By
contrast, for quantum-classical states (B embedding a
classical variable), we have the opposite situation, i.e.,
D(A|B) = 0 and D(B|A) > 0.
Device-dependent QKD protocols.– Any QKD protocol
can be recast into a measurement-based scheme, where
Alice sends Bob part of a bipartite state, then subject to
local detections. Adopting this representation, we con-
sider a device-dependent protocol where extra noise af-
fects Alice’s state preparation, as in Fig. 1 (this is gen-
eralized later). In her private space, Alice prepares two
systems, A and a, in a generally mixed state ρAa. This
state is purified into a 3-partite state ΦPAa with the an-
cillary system P being inaccessible to Alice, Bob or Eve.
System a is then sent to Bob, who gets the output
system B. From the shared state ρAB, Alice and Bob
extract two correlated variables: System A is detected by
a rank-1 POVM {Mx}, providing Alice with variableX =
{x, px}, while B is detected by another rank-1 POVM
{My}, providing Bob with variable Y = {y, py}, whose
correlations with X are quantified by the classical mutual
information I(X,Y ).
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FIG. 1: Device-dependent protocol with preparation noise.
Alice prepares a generally-mixed input state ρAa, which is
purified into a state ΦPAa by adding an extra system P inac-
cessible to all parties. System a is sent through an insecure
line, so that Alice and Bob share an output state ρAB. By
applying rank-1 POVMs on their local systems, A and B,
they derive two correlated random variables, X and Y , which
are processed into a secret key. In the middle, Eve attacks
the line using a unitary U which couples system a with a
pure-state ancilla e. The output ancilla E is then stored in a
quantum memory, which is coherently detected at the end of
the protocol.
After the previous process has been repeated many
times, Alice and Bob publicly compare a subset of their
data. If the error rate is below a certain threshold, they
apply classical procedures of error correction and privacy
amplification with the help of one-way CC, which can
be either forward from Alice to Bob (direct reconcilia-
tion), or backward from Bob to Alice (reverse reconcili-
ation). Thus, they finally extract a secret key at a rate
K ≤ I(X,Y ), which is denoted by K(Y |X) in direct
reconciliation and K(X |Y ) in reverse reconciliation.
To quantify these rates, we need to model Eve’s at-
tack. The most general attack is greatly reduced if Alice
and Bob perform random permutations on their classical
data [30, 31]. As a result, Eve’s attack collapses into a
collective attack, where each travelling system is probed
by an independent ancilla. This means that Eve’s inter-
action can be represented by a two-system unitary Uae
coupling system a with an ancillary system e prepared
in a pure state [32]. The output ancilla E is then stored
in a quantum memory which is coherently measured at
the end of the protocol (see Fig. 1). In this attack, the
maximum information which is stolen on X or Y cannot
exceed the Holevo bound.
Non-zero discord is necessary.– Before analyzing the
secret-key rates, we briefly clarify why discord is a nec-
essary resource for QKD. Suppose that Alice prepares a
quantum-classical state ρAa =
∑
k pkρA(k)⊗|k〉a〈k| with
{|k〉} orthogonal, so that D(A|a) = 0. Classical system a
is perfectly clonable by Eve. This implies that the three
parties will share the state [33]
ρABE =
∑
k
pkρA(k)⊗ |k〉B〈k| ⊗ |k〉E〈k|,
with Eve fully invisible, since her action is equivalent to
an identity channel for Alice and Bob (ρAB = ρAa).
Direct reconciliation fails since ρABE is symmetric un-
der B-E permutation, which means that Eve decodes
Alice’s variable with the same accuracy of Bob. Reverse
reconciliation also fails. Bob encodes Y in the joint state
ρAE|y =
∑
k pk|yρA(k)⊗|k〉E〈k|, where pk|y := 〈k|My|k〉.
Then, Eve retrievesK = {k, pk|y} by a projective POVM,
while Alice decodes a variable X with distribution
px|y = Tr(MxρA|y) =
∑
k
px|kpk|y, px|k := Tr[MxρA(k)].
This equation defines a Markov chain Y → K → X ,
so that I(Y,K) ≥ I(Y,X) by data processing inequality,
i.e., Eve gets more information than Alice [34].
As expected, system a sent through the channel must
be quantum D(A|a) > 0 in order to have a secure QKD.
Indeed, this is equivalent to sending an ensemble of non-
orthogonal states. By contrast, the classicality of the
private system A is still acceptable, i.e., we can have
D(a|A) = 0. In fact, we may build QKD protocols with
preparation noise using classical-quantum states
ρAa =
∑
x
px|x〉A〈x| ⊗ ρa(x), (2)
3whose local detection (on system A) prepares any desired
ensemble of non-orthogonal signal states {ρa(x), px}. For
instance, the classical-quantum state of two qubits ρAa =
(|0, 0〉Aa〈0, 0|+ |1, ϕ〉Aa〈1, ϕ|)/2, with {|0〉, |1〉} orthonor-
mal and 〈0|ϕ〉 6= 0, realizes the B92 protocol [35].
Secret-key rates.– Once we have clarified that non-
zero input discord D(A|a) > 0 is a necessary condition
for QKD, we now study the secret-key rates which can
be achieved by device-dependent protocols. Our next
derivation refers to the protocol of Fig. 1 and, more gen-
erally, to the scheme of Fig. 2, where Alice and Bob share
an output state ρAB, where only part of the purification
is accessible to Eve (system E), while the inaccessible
part P accounts for all possible forms of extra noise in
Alice’s and Bob’s apparata, including preparation noise
and detection noise (quantum inefficiencies, etc...)
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FIG. 2: Output state from a device-dependent QKD proto-
col. Alice and Bob extract a secret-key by applying rank-1
POVMs on their local systems A and B. Eve steals informa-
tion from system E, while the extra system P is inaccessible
and completes the purification of the global state ΨABEP .
In direct reconciliation, Alice’s variableX is the encod-
ing to guess. The key rate is then given by K(Y |X) =
I(X,Y ) − I(E,X), where I(E,X) = S(E) − S(E|X)
is the Holevo bound quantifying the maximal informa-
tion that Eve can steal on Alice’s variable [36]. We
can write an achievable upper bound if we allow Bob
to use a quantum memory and a coherent detector. In
this case, I(X,Y ) must be replaced by the Holevo quan-
tity I(B,X) = S(B) − S(B|X) and we get the forward
Devetak-Winter (DW) rate [37–39]
K(Y |X) ≤ K(B|X) := I(B,X)− I(E,X). (3)
The optimal forward-rate is defined by optimizing on Al-
ice’s individual detections K(◮) := sup{Mx}K(B|X).
We can write similar quantities in reverse reconcilia-
tion, where Bob’s variable Y is the encoding to infer. The
secret key rate is given by K(X |Y ) = I(X,Y )− I(E, Y ),
where I(E, Y ) = S(E) − S(E|Y ) is Eve’s Holevo infor-
mation on Y . Assuming a coherent detector for Alice,
this rate is bounded by the backward DW rate
K(X |Y ) ≤ K(A|Y ) := I(A, Y )− I(E, Y ), (4)
which gives the optimal backward-rate K(◭) by maxi-
mizing on Bob’s individual detections {My}.
Playing with system P , we can easily derive upper and
lower bounds for the two optimal rates. Clearly, we get
lower bounds K∗ ≤ K if we assume P to be accessible
to Eve, which means to extend E to the joint system
E = EP in previous Eqs. (3) and (4). By exploiting the
purity of the global state ΨABE and the fact that the
encoding detections are rank-1 POVMs (therefore col-
lapsing pure states into pure states), we can write the
entropic equalities S(AB) = S(E), S(B|X) = S(E|X)
and S(A|Y ) = S(E|Y ). Then we easily derive
K∗(◮) = Ic(A〉B), K∗(◭) = Ic(B〉A),
where the coherent information Ic(A〉B) and its reverse
counterpart [23, 40] Ic(B〉A) quantify the maximal en-
tanglement which is distillable by local operations and
one-way CC, forward and backward, respectively.
It is also clear that we get upperbounds K∗ ≥ K by as-
suming P to be accessible to the decoding party, Alice or
Bob, depending on the reconciliation. In direct reconcili-
ation, we assume P to be accessible to Bob, which means
extending his system B to B = BP in Eq. (3). Using the
equalities S(AB) = S(E) and S(B|X) = S(E|X), we get
K∗(◮) = Ic(A〉B) = Ic(A〉B) + I(A,P |B),
where I(A,P |B) ≥ 0 is the conditional quantum mutual
information. Then, in reverse reconciliation, we assume
P to be accessible to Alice, so that A becomesA = AP in
Eq. (4). Using S(AB) = S(E) and S(A|Y ) = S(E|Y ),
we get K∗(◭) = Ic(B〉A) + I(B,P |A).
Thus, the optimal key rates satisfy the inequalities
Ic(A〉B) ≤ K(◮) ≤ Ic(A〉B) + I(A,P |B), (5)
Ic(B〉A) ≤ K(◭) ≤ Ic(B〉A) + I(B,P |A), (6)
where the right hand sides can be bounded using
I(A,P |B), I(B,P |A) ≤ I(AB,P ) ≤ 2min{S(P ), S(AB)}.
According to Eqs. (5) and (6), key distribution can occur
(K ≥ 0) even in the absence of distillable entanglement
(Ic = 0). It is now important to note the following facts:
(i) Device-dependent QKD is the only scenario where
this is possible. In fact, only in the presence of trusted
noise, i.e., S(P ) > 0, we can have K ≥ Ic in the previ-
ous equations. Therefore device-dependent QKD is the
only scenario where security may be achieved in the ab-
sence of distillable entanglement and, more strongly, in
the complete absence of entanglement.
(ii) In device-dependent QKD, we can indeed build
protocols which are secure (K > 0) despite entangle-
ment being completely absent (in any form, distillable
or bound). Clearly, this is possible as long as the mini-
mal condition D(A|a) > 0 is satisfied. A secure protocol
based on separable Gaussian states is explictly shown in
the supplementary material.
In general, there is an easy way to design device-
dependent protocols which are secure and free of entan-
glement. Any prepare and measure protocol whose secu-
rity is based on the transmission of non-orthogonal states
4{ρa(x), px} can be recast into a device-dependent proto-
col, which is based on a classical-quantum state ρAa as
in Eq. (2), whose classical part A is detected while the
quantum part a is sent through the channel. This is as se-
cure as the original one as long as the purification of the
classical-quantum state is inaccessible to Eve. Thus in
such assumption of trusted noise, any prepare and mea-
sure protocol has an equivalent discord-based represen-
tation, where non-zero discord guarantees security in the
place of non-orthogonality.
Side-channels and device-independent QKD.– Let us
consider the more demanding scenario where all sources
of noise are untrusted. This means that the extra noise
in Alice’s and Bob’s apparata comes from side-channel
attacks, i.e., system P in Fig. 2 is controlled by Eve. In
this case, the secret-key rates are given by
K(◮) = Ic(A〉B), K(◭) = Ic(B〉A), (7)
so that QKD is equivalent to entanglement distillation.
It is easy to check that quantum discord upperbounds
these key rates. Applying Eq. (1) to Eq. (7), we obtain
the cryptographic relations
K(◮) = D(A|B) − Ef (A,E) ≤ D(A|B), (8)
K(◭) = D(B|A) − Ef (B,E) ≤ D(B|A). (9)
The optimal forward rate K(◮), where Alice’s variable
must be inferred, equals the difference between the out-
put discord D(A|B), based on Bob’s detections, and the
entanglement of formation Ef (A,E) between Alice and
Eve. Situation is reversed for the other rate K(◭). Note
that quantum discord not only provides an upper bound
to the key rates, but its aymmetric definition, D(A|B)
or D(B|A), is closely connected with the reconciliation
direction (direct ◮ or reverse ◭).
Ideal QKD protocols.– In practical quantum cryptog-
raphy, extra noise is always present, and we distinguish
between device-dependent and device-independent QKD
on the basis of Eve’s accessibility of the extra system
P . In theoretical studies of quantum cryptography, it is
however common to design and assess new protocols by
assuming no-extra noise in Alice’s and Bob’s apparata
(perfect state preparation and perfect detections).
This is an ideal scenario where system P of Fig. 2 is
simply absent. For such ideal QKD protocols, the secret-
key rates satisfy again Eqs. (7), (8), and (9), computed
on the corresponding output states. Remarkably, the dis-
cord bound can be found to be tight in reverse reconcilia-
tion. In fact, as we show in the supplementary material,
we can have K(◭) = D(B|A) in an ideal protocol of
continuous-variable QKD, where Alice transmits part of
an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) state over a pure-loss
channel, such as an optical fiber.
Conclusion and discussion.– Quantum discord can be
regarded as a bipartite formulation of non-orthogonality,
therefore capturing the minimal requisite for QKD. In
this paper we have identified the general framework,
device-dependent QKD, where discord remains the ulti-
mate cryptographic primitive able to guarantee security
in the place of quantum entanglement.
We have considered a general form of device-dependent
protocol, where Alice and Bob share a bipartite state
which can be purified by two systems: One system (E) is
accessible to Eve, while the other (P ) is inaccessible and
accounts from the presence of trusted noise, e.g., coming
from imperfections in the state preparation and/or the
quantum detections. This is a scenario where the opti-
mal key rate may outperform the coherent information
and key distribution may occur in the complete absence
of entanglement (in any form, distillable or bound) as
long as discord is non-zero. As a matter of fact, any
prepare and measure QKD protocol whose security is
based on non-orthogonal quantum states can be recast
into an entanglement-free device-dependent form which
is based on a classical-quantum state, with non-zero dis-
cord transmitted through the channel.
This discord-based representation is secure as long as
the extra system P is truly inaccessible to Eve, i.e., Al-
ice’s and Bob’s private spaces cannot be accessed. Such
a condition fails assuming side-channel attacks, where no
noise can be trusted and P becomes part of Eve’s sys-
tems. In this case, the secret-key rates are again dom-
inated by the coherent information, which means that
entanglement remains the crucial resource for device-
independent QKD. For both device-independent QKD
and ideal QKD (where system P is absent), discord still
represents an upper bound to the optimal secret-key rates
achievable in direct or reverse reconciliation, with non
trivial cases where this bound becomes tight.
In conclusion, quantum discord is a necessary resource
for secure QKD. This is particularly evident in device-
dependent QKD where entanglement is a sufficient but
not a necessary resource. Entanglement becomes neces-
sary in device-independent and ideal QKD, where discord
still provides an upper bound to the secret-key rates. Fu-
ture work may involve the derivation of a direct mathe-
matical relation between the amount of quantum discord
in Alice and Bob’s output state and the optimal secret-
key rates which are achievable in device-dependent QKD.
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Supplementary Material
KEYS FROM SEPARABLE GAUSSIAN STATES
Here we provide a simple example of device-dependent
QKD protocol which is based on the distribution of a bi-
partite Gaussian state which is mixed and separable (not
in a tensor-product, therefore having non-zero discord).
We show that the key rates can be positive despite no en-
tanglement being present. The reader not familiar with
the formalism of bosonic systems and Gaussian states can
find these concepts in Ref. [S1], whose notation is here
adopted (ℏ = 2 and unit vacuum noise).
Let us consider a continuous variable QKD protocol
where Alice prepares two bosonic modes, A and a, in a
separable Gaussian state ρAa, with zero mean and co-
variance matrix (CM)
VAa =
(
µI G
G µI
)
,
where µ ≥ 1 and G is a diagonal correlation block which
can be in one of the following forms
G =
(
g
g
)
:= gI, G =
(
g
−g
)
:= gZ.
Here the parameter g must satisfy |g| ≤ µ − 1, so that
VAa is both physical and separable [S2]. Apart from the
singular case g = 0, this symmetric Gaussian state has
always non-zero discord, i.e., D(A|a) = D(a|A) > 0 [S3].
Mode a is sent through the channel, where Eve per-
forms a collective Gaussian attack, whose most general
description can be found in Ref [S4]. Assuming random
permutations (so that quantum de Finetti applies), this is
the most powerful attack against Gaussian protocols [S1].
One of the canonical forms of this attack is the so-called
‘entangling cloner’ attack [S1], where Eve uses a beam
splitter with transmissivity τ to mix the incoming mode
a with one mode e of an EPR state ρeE′ with CM
VeE′ =
(
ωI
√
ω2 − 1Z√
ω2 − 1Z ωI
)
:= V(ω), (10)
6where ω ≥ 1. One output mode B is sent to Bob, while
the other output mode E is stored in a quantum memory
together with the retained mode E′. Such memory will
be coherently detected at the end of the protocol.
In order to extract two correlated (complex) variables,
X and Y , Alice and Bob heterodyne their local modes A
and B. (Note that other protocols involving homodyne
detection for one of the parties or even two homodynes
may be considered as well.) One can easily check that Al-
ice remotely prepares thermal states on mode a. In fact,
by heterodyning mode A, the other mode a is collapsed
in a Gaussian state ρa|X with CM Va|X = (1+ε)I, where
ε := µ− 1− g
2
µ+ 1
≥ 0
quantifies the thermalization above the coherent state.
This conditional thermal state is randomly displaced in
the phase space according to a bivariate Gaussian distri-
bution with variance µ− 1− ε (so that the average input
state on mode a is thermal with the correct CM µI).
At the output of the channel, Bob’s average state is
thermal with CM νBI, where νB := τµ + (1 − τ)ω. By
propagating the conditional thermal state ρa|X , we also
get Bob’s conditional state ρB|X , which is randomly dis-
placed and has CM νB|XI, where
νB|X := τ(1 + ε) + (1− τ)ω = νB −
τg2
µ+ 1
.
Therefore, we can easily compute Alice and Bob’s mutual
information, which is equal to
I(X,Y ) = log2
νB + 1
νB|X + 1
.
The next step is the calculation of Eve’s Holevo in-
formation on Alice’s and Bob’s variables. We derive the
global state of Alice, Bob and Eve, which is pure Gaus-
sian with zero mean and CM
VABEE′ =


µI
√
τG −√1− τG 0√
τG νBI γI δZ
−√1− τG γI νEI κZ
0 δZ κZ ωI

 ,
where 0 is the 2× 2 zero matrix, and
νE := τω + (1− τ)µ, γ :=
√
τ(1 − τ)(ω − µ),
δ :=
√
1− τ
√
ω2 − 1, κ :=
√
τ(ω2 − 1).
From this global CM, we extract Eve’s reduced CM
VEE′ := VE describing the two output modes E = EE
′
of the entangling cloner. This reduced CM has symplectic
spectrum [S1]
ν±
E
=
√
α2 + 4β ± α
2
,
where α := (1−τ)(µ−ω) and β := τ+(1−τ)µω. The von
Neumann entropy of Eve’s average state is then given by
S(E) = h(ν+
E
) + h(ν−
E
), where
h(x) :=
x+ 1
2
log2
x+ 1
2
− x− 1
2
log2
x− 1
2
.
By transforming the global CM under heterodyne de-
tection [S1], we compute Eve’s conditional CMs. First,
we derive Eve’s CM conditioned to Bob’s detection
VE|Y = VE −
1
νB + 1
(
γ2I γδZ
γδZ δ2I
)
,
which has symplectic spectrum
ν−
E|Y = 1, ν
+
E|Y =
µ+ β
1 + µτ + (1− τ)ω .
Then, Eve’s CM conditioned to Alice’s detection is
VE|X = VE −
(1− τ)g2
µ+ 1
(
I 0
0 0
)
,
and has symplectic spectrum
ν±
E|X =
√
θ2 + 4(µ+ 1)φ± θ
2(µ+ 1)
,
where
θ := (1− τ)g2 − (µ+ 1)α, φ := (µ+ 1)β − (1− τ)ωg2.
From the previous conditional spectra, we compute
Eve’s conditional entropies
S(E|X) = h(ν+
E|X) + h(ν
−
E|X), S(E|Y ) = h(ν+E|Y ),
and, therefore, we can derive the two Holevo quantities
I(E, X) = S(E)−S(E|X) and I(E, Y ) = S(E)−S(E|Y ).
By subtracting these from Alice and Bob’s mutual infor-
mation I(X,Y ), we finally get the two key rates in direct
and reverse reconciliation, i.e., K(Y |X) and K(X |Y ).
It is easy to check the existence of wide range of pa-
rameters for which these two rates are strictly positive,
so that Alice and Bob can extract a secret key despite
the absence of entanglement (at the input state ρAa and,
therefore, also at the output state ρAB). As an example,
we may consider the maximum correlation value g = µ−1
for the separable Gaussian state ρAa, and we may take
the large modulation limit µ → +∞, as typical in con-
tinuous variable QKD. In this case, we get the following
asymptotical expression for Alice and Bob’s mutual in-
formation
I(X,Y )→ log2
τµ
1 + 3τ + (1− τ)ω +O(µ
−1),
and the following asymptotical spectra
ν−
E
→ (1 − τ)µ+ τω +O(µ−1),
ν+
E
→ ω +O(µ−1),
ν+
E|Y →
1 + (1 − τ)ω
τ
+O(µ−1),
ν±
E|X → ξ± +O(µ−1),
7where
ξ± :=
√
(ω + 3)2 + τ2(ω − 3)2 − 2τ(ω2 + 7)
2
± (1− τ)(ω − 3)
2
.
Then, using the expansion h(x) ≃ log2(ex/2) + O(1/x)
for large x, we can write the two asymptotical rates
K(Y |X) = R(τ, ω) + h(ξ+) + h(ξ−),
K(X |Y ) = R(τ, ω) + h
[
1 + (1− τ)ω
τ
]
,
where we have introduced the common term
R(τ, ω) := log2
2τ
e(1− τ)[1 + 3τ + (1− τ)ω] − h(ω).
As we can see from Fig. 3, there are wide regions of pos-
itivity for these rates.
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FIG. 3: Left panel. Rate K(Y |X) in direct reconciliation, as
a function of channel transmissivity τ and thermal variance
ω. K is positive in the white area, while it is zero in the black
area. Right panel. Rate K(X|Y ) in reverse reconciliation, as
function of τ and ω. White area (K > 0) is wider at low ω.
In particular, for a pure loss channel (ω = 1), the pre-
vious asymptotical rates simplify to the following
K(Y |X) = log2
τ
e(1− τ2) + h(3− 2τ),
which is positive for any τ > 0.693, and
K(X |Y ) = log2
τ
e(1− τ2) + h
(
2
τ
− 1
)
,
which is positive for any τ > 0.532.
DISCORD BOUND CAN BE TIGHT
Here we discuss a typical scenario where the optimal
backward rate K(◭) of an ideal QKD protocol is exactly
equal to the output discord D(B|A) shared by Alice and
Bob. This happens in continuous variable QKD, where
reverse reconciliation is important for its ability to beat
the 3dB loss-limit affecting direct reconciliation [S1].
Consider an ideal QKD protocol which is based on the
distribution of an EPR state ρAa, with CM VAa = V(µ)
defined according to Eq. (10) with µ ≥ 1. By performing
a rank-1 Gaussian POVM onmode A, Alice remotely pre-
pares an ensemble of Gaussianly-modulated pure Gaus-
sian states on the other mode a. For instance, hetero-
dyne prepares coherent states, while homodyne prepares
squeezed states. On average, mode a is described by a
thermal state with CM µI.
Suppose that signal mode a is subject to a pure-loss
channel. This means that Eve is using a beam splitter of
transmissivity τ mixing the signal mode with a vacuum
mode e. At the output of the beam splitter, mode B is
detected by Bob, while mode E is stored in a quantum
memory coherently detected by Eve (this is a collective
entangling cloner attack with ω = 1).
Since the average state of mode a is thermal and mode
e is in the vacuum, no entanglement can be present be-
tween the two output ports B and E of the beam splitter.
This implies that their entanglement of formation must
be zero Ef (B,E) = 0 and, therefore, the optimal back-
ward rate K(◭) must be equal to the discord D(B|A) of
the Gaussian state ρAB. Since this output state has CM
VAB =
(
µI
√
τ(µ2 − 1)Z√
τ(µ2 − 1)Z (τµ+ 1− τ)I
)
,
its discord is easy to compute and is equal to [S5]
D(B|A) = h(µ)− h[τ + (1− τ)µ].
For large modulation (µ→ +∞), we have the asymptotic
expression
K(◭) = D(B|A) = log2
(
1
1− τ
)
,
which is positive for any 0 < τ < 1. One can check
that this rate can be achieved by heterodyne detections
at Bob’s side (and coherent detection at Alice’s side).
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